Abstract:
The struggles around notions of creative research are in some ways engaged with the return of the subject in the face of post/structuralist moves that have tried to evacuate or dissolve subjectivity, or reduce it to an element in a structure. What this kind of subjectivity is, and how to define it, seems up for grabs. What I suggest is that creative research is trying to stretch beyond its boundaries by advocating for a knowledge-producing subjectivity that rejects the methodological positivism of so-called real research (which in many ways is centred upon the presupposition of a transcendental subject), while negotiating the discourses of postmodernity and post/structuralism which are suspicious of, or radically dismiss, subjectivity as a category. I suggest that creative research might be a radical gesture, indeed a radical subjectivity, whose possibilities as critical/creative practices reveal the human content of the seemingly autonomous forms which are the outcome of the fragmentary world of capitalist social relations.

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Introduction

Creative research as a discipline and as a methodology has had a difficult birth (Webb & Brien 2008) with attacks on its rigour and its status as real research (Biggs & Büchler 2007; Dawson 2008; McIntyre 2006). Like Paul Carter, I agree that imagination, invention and creativity are all involved with research as a given (Carter 2004: 7-10). The necessity of dividing creative research from real research seems to me not only an exercise in bureaucratic categorisation, but also a political necessity within an academic system that has increasingly come under the disciplining forces of capital and the market (Dawson 2008; Kälvemark 2010: 3).

I suggest that creative research is in some way engaged with the return of the subject in the face of post/structuralist moves that have tried to evacuate or dissolve subjectivity, or reduce it to an element in a structure. What this kind of subjectivity is, and how to define it, seems up for grabs.

Instrumentality appears to be a major motivation within the creative research paradigm, often taking the form of a struggle to advocate for the role of creative practice within the academy, or an attempt to situate the role of creative research within pedagogical frameworks. In the creative industries, with its discourse of innovation and research directly for the economy, creativity is seen as having benefits for societal wealth accumulation with the idea that it helps ‘drive, facilitate and engender the origination and adoption of new ideas (the innovation process) into the sociocultural and economic system’ (Potts 2011: 2). These instrumental arguments might be seen as an advance from the ethico-cultural subject of critical or aesthetic traditions that views creative work as a necessary moral good or artistic practice as autonomous – a realm of freedom somehow beyond the limits of a social totality.

What I want to suggest is that the kind of subject that is at stake in creative research has much in common with a kind of radical subjectivity. This is a subjectivity that not only moves beyond its philosophical category, but attempts to unite the divide of object and subject through what Marx (1990) calls ‘purposeful activity’.

Further, creative research might become a mode of practice that seeks to be critical rather than instrumental, and this in turn situates creative practice not as a functional site of capital’s structure, but as a mode of the transcendence of capitalist social relations.

Creative research

Creative research discussions are often contextualised in terms of the fragmentation and multiplicity of knowledge – with creative practice being seen as a ‘production of knowledge’ that requires the ‘connection’ of theory and practice to validate itself as ‘scholarly research’ (Barrett & Bolt 2007: 193). Creative research claims an epistemological foundation that seeks to separate itself from the objectivism and methodological positivism of empiricism, while emphasising situated knowledges and the ‘emergent nature of research’.
The conduct of research in, or through, creative practice is associated with the acknowledgement of uncertainty and contingency, the denial of grand narratives, a tolerance of complexity and confusion and both willingness and capacity to be led by the data rather than by a predetermined point of view. (Webb et al 2011)

Paul Carter suggests that it involves ‘material thinking’, defining creative research in light of the emergence of it as a discipline against ‘a research paradigm … in which knowledge and creativity are conceived as mutually exclusive’ (2004: 7-9). Material thinking is the ‘discourse of creative research’; it has an emphasis on process (against disciplinarity); it ‘connects diverse things’ in an act of ‘invention’ (‘[r]ecalling that the word discourse carries a physical sense of running hither and thither’) that deals in some way with myth-making (Carter 2004: 7-9).

Carter’s aim is to materialise the discourse of creativity as a ‘local reinvention of social relations’, one against ‘master narratives’:

This is the typical error of artists and plastic-makers generally: called upon to talk about what they do, they rationalise its internal logic instead of gauging its social effect … rather than account for the work as a structure for reinventing human relations. (Carter 2004: 10)

This reinvention, this ‘making the work inseparable from what is produced’, amounts to a ‘realm of Becoming’ whose motivation is ‘not aesthetic but social and political’ (Carter 2004: 11).

There are many virtues to arguments about the role of creative research: the emphasis on practical activity – with its concentration on process and movement – as a generator of knowledge; an acceptance, indeed a welcoming, of the uncertainty of outcomes and the contingency of creative practice; an emphasis on particularity that places a focus on the qualitative value of research; advocacy for a subjectivity that isn’t devalued for its lack of objectivity, but rather is valued as a site of the possible ‘reinvention of social relations’ (Carter 2005: 11). Barbara Bolt makes a similar claim for creative research in trying to define it in relation to the performative act: for her, creative research ‘doesn’t describe something but rather it does something in the world … [t]his takes the focus away from describing, explaining or interpreting a work into a new realm of understanding [my italics]’ (Bolt 2008: para. 37). Creative research in this mode advances the kind of subjectivity that seeks to move beyond existing social relations, offering a form of resistance to orthodox research paradigms and therefore a projection of what is new.

We may characterise this contextualisation of creative research as Carole Gray does, as the result of a ‘complex, changing, post-postmodern world’ (Gray 1998: 7), and link it in with a postmodern epistemological paradigm that ‘no longer seeks an ontological foundation in itself as transcendental subject, or outside itself in some timeless substance’ (Kearney quoted in Hanrahan 2006: 144). However, I think there are critiques to be made of this approach. I am not against the valuable developments of creative research. But I believe that there are limits in the creative research paradigm’s recognition of what it might develop, both for subjectivity and for that ‘reinvention of social relations’ that Paul Carter advocates.
The first critique is that creative research appears to privilege theory over criticism. In some ways this is a positive development in that, as Carole Gray suggests, ‘[a]n increasing number of practising artists and designers are claiming ownership and taking responsibility for the critical reflection and evaluation of their own and peers’ practices’ (Gray 1998: 8). This is against the illusion of criticism as an objective discourse, and criticism as a specialised object of knowledge. But in eliding criticism in favour of theory, the activity of practice is robbed of its critical potential. That is, when theory is seen as a tangential, or contextualising, justificatory stratagem for materialising the interestedness of practice rather than as a critical activity in itself, then theory becomes merely an abstraction, and practice does too. This further elides the fact that criticism, as a creative activity, has been heavily involved through its history in the interrogation of and reinvention of social relations.² What this leads to in some cases is suppression of the critical subjectivity in favour of an all-encompassing artistic subjectivity, with the privileging consequences that entails, including advocating for the special nature, or autonomous role, of art and artistic practice. Henk Borgdorff’s ‘The production of knowledge in artistic research’, for example, in specifying the qualitative difference of creative practice as a mode of research, falls back on the mystifications of a ‘je ne sais quoi of artistic aesthetic experience’ that ‘cannot be efficiently expressed linguistically’ and ‘as a matter of principle … refuses every explanatory gaze’ (Borgdorff 2010: 47).

This leads into the broader problem of the acceptance and consequent lack of interrogation of the multiplicity and fragmentation of the social world under capitalism. In this ‘post-postmodern world’ creative practice as research is seen as a negotiating strategy for combining diverse knowledges from, or of producing knowledges for, social phenomena seen as separate (again, for example, Barrett & Bolt 2007: 193). This strategy requires an epistemological approach that searches for (or produces) interrelations, or involvements, or overdeterminations, between predetermined sites located within a theoretical structure outside of history (Cleaver 1979: 33). While this leads in many instances to fruitful outcomes for both research and practice, such an approach, with its emphasis on the meta-narrative of locality, fails to interrogate the fragmentation of the social world, while, perversely, advocating a new creative subjectivity in the face of the post/structuralist moves that have interrogated and dissolved subjectivity as a misrecognition or fiction.

What I suggest is that creative research is trying to stretch beyond its boundaries by advocating for a knowledge-producing subjectivity that rejects the methodological positivism of so-called real research (which in many ways is centred upon the presupposition of a transcendental subject), while negotiating the discourses of modernity and post/structuralism which are suspicious of, or radically dismiss, subjectivity as a category.³ Ideas of the subject need revision. A subjectivity is required that is not posited against objectivity, but embraces subjectivity’s creative/critical constitution against the fragmentary forces of the capitalist social world. And this is where I think that creativity and criticism, as practical human activity, as movement not only against but beyond existing social relations, has a role to play in clarifying concepts of the creative subject as outlined by creative research.
Fragmentation and the promise of autonomy

Debate surrounds the commensurate nature of creativity and research as separate elements (see, for example, Biggs & Büchler (2007) above). ‘Creativity’ is seen as an amorphous, irrational concept; ‘research’ a rationalising force tied to the institutional nature of the academy. How, in other words, can the academy accommodate creativity, and research be seen as creative? Conversely, how can practice and creativity be seen as involving some element of research? This tension is often resolved by a turn to the valorisation (and ultimate objectivity) of qualitative research (derived from social sciences) or by the restatement (though in muted terms) of the autonomy or special place of artistic practice (see, for example, Borgdorff (2010) above).

Here the maker/researcher is seen as a vanguard in this process: a subjectivity negotiating seemingly separate realms of activity for the promise of outcomes – whether they are for innovation or strictly as objects quantifiable under the rubric of various government or market imposed measures (e.g. research grant allocations, journal ranking listings, job training, market utility). Further, this subjectivity is seen by, for example, some practitioners, as existing in the autonomous realm of an academy somehow separate from the real world (a rather outdated notion) or, for example, in the creative industries approach, as a purveyor of possible futures within the bourgeois marketplace of employment, innovation and productivity. The first manifests itself in ideas of escape or retreat of the maker from the rigours of the marketplace (‘if you can’t do, teach’). The second manifests either as an eagerness for the possibilities of market utility (i.e. creative industries), or as the acquiescence to structural imperatives (‘that’s just the way things are’) and an emphasis on functionality.

At the very least what the attempts to articulate the struggles and tensions around creative research do is to foreground the often mystified and elided role of the academy as a capitalist social relation. The seemingly autonomous forms here (marketplace, government, policy, art, research, creativity, academy etc.) reflect the fragmentation of capitalist social relations. Their tensions wend their way through discussions of, and resistances to, many of the formulations of creative research. The struggles and difficulties that arise from trying to situate the maker/researcher’s subjectivity result from the fragmented, definitional social world of capital; as does the promise and restraint of autonomy as expressions of agency and structure.

Marxian thought gives us a way of understanding from where this fragmentation arises through the central concerns of a category of Marx’s critique of political economy – the commodity form. What follows may be seen as a digression from the argument above. My hope is that its necessity will become clear as the argument proceeds.

My position arises from what might be called a heterodox Marxism that rethinks the orthodox Marxist commitments to the abolition of private property and institutions of class-domination, the teleological necessity of communism, the positivism of an economic base influencing an ideological superstructure, the necessity of a
revolutionary vanguard party taking power within the framework of a nation-state, an epistemological positivism that seeks a science of society as opposed to a mere philosophy, and a conception of capital as an object which must be confronted by the heroic subject of labour (Rooke 1998: 5).

For Marx, the commodity form objectifies individual, particular labour within market relations, where the human content of labour is objectified in the seemingly autonomous form of money and exchange (Marx 1990). The objective character of money appears to equalise and universalise particular and heterogeneous social relations of labour. ‘We move’, says David Harvey, ‘from a social condition, in which we depend directly on those we know personally, to one in which we depend on impersonal and objective relations with others’ (Harvey 1990: 100).

Rapid technological innovation and change are used to increase profits for the capitalist, but these profits are merely the appearance of the value given to the commodity by labour time (i.e. the commodity form). So, capital is constantly innovating beyond its contemporary bounds, but is bound to its own functional dynamic by its reliance on labour. This is the contradiction at the heart of the value-form, and the contradiction that Marx pointed out in Capital. Hence, ‘The historical dynamic of capitalism ceaselessly generates what is “new”, while regenerating what is the “same”. This dynamic both generates the possibility of another organisation of social life and, yet, hinders that possibility from being realised’ (Postone 2004: 63).

John Holloway calls this the ‘fracturing of doing from done’, specifically under the market relations of capital: the split between subject and object (Holloway 2002: 31; Lukács 1971; Rooke 2003). Marx tells us:

The mysterious character of the commodity-form consists therefore simply in the fact that the commodity reflects the social characteristics of men’s own labour as objective characteristics of the products of labour themselves, as the socio-natural properties of these things. (1990: 165)

This amounts to the formulation that in capitalism, relationships between things take on the characteristics of relations between people, and vice versa. In that the commodity form objectifies social labour, domination is perpetuated by the objectification of subjectivity into an impersonal process that, while promising greater freedom and autonomy, delivers subjects ‘isolated in their individuality because of society’s competitive exploitative structure … powerless effectively, to alter the institutions and conditions of economic domination under which they subsist’ (Lutz 2009: 427). Marx situates this need for autonomy in the very system that stymies its realisation: capital’s need for limitless accumulation to maintain its reproductive momentum.

Commodity fetishism is not a false perception of reality, but the necessary way that the phenomenon of commodity exchange and production appears – can only appear (Balibar 2007: 60-61; Rooke 1998). As Etienne Balibar suggests: ‘it is the exchange-values of commodities which, in the view of each producer, represent in inverted fashion … the relationship between their own labour and that of all other producers’ (2007: 61). With commodity fetishism, Marx is able to redefine objectivity:
The mechanism of fetishism is indeed, in one sense, a constituting of the world: the social world, structured by relations of exchange, which clearly represents the greater part of the ‘nature’ in which human individuals live, think, and act today. (Balibar 2007: 66)

I believe this movement – of autonomy and restraint; of the fracturing of subject and object, and the reification of social relations which Marx derives from the commodity form – is one in which the creative subject is captured, or rather founded and maintained, and which the practice of creative research both seeks to articulate, and struggles against. That is, creative research finds itself in a position that either sees objective structures (the system, capital) as being self-determining subjects that restrain and configure human practice, or it sees a pre-determined, autonomous, creative human subjectivity that opposes demands made by the capitalist system:

Approaches predicated on the notion of labour’s autonomy from capital tend to divide social existence into distinct spheres of, on one hand, a machine-like logic of capital and the transcendental power of social practice. (Bonefeld 1995: 189)

Critical/creative

Where does this leave the maker/researcher? Understanding the commodity fetish as the objectification of social relations is to see it as the inescapable result of life under capital and in some ways to negate the possibilities of resistance or to amplify resignation as a mode of existence. Understanding, however, that capital is a form of social constitution that requires as premise and outcome the denial of purposeful activity in the form of alienated labour is to understand the antagonistic mode of existence of human content in capitalist society. That is, human practice ‘subsists in and through commodities in the mode of being denied’ (Bonefeld 1995: 190). This is human content as the centrality of the creative power of human practice.

Science understood as the external relationship between objects, or between subject and object, is based upon the objectivising process of fracturing subject from object and of reifying human activity. The dualism of subject and object is not a pre-existing thing to find a relationship between. Subjectivity and objectivity are different modes of existence of constitutive social relations – that is, they emerge from human content as practice, the creative power of human practice (Holloway 1995: 170). This in its turn suggests the dissolution of the hard dualism of subject and object:

[I]t is only when those concepts are understood in a practical-genetic [constitutive] sense that the symmetry of subject and object disappears: it becomes clear that there is no object; there is only a subject. (Holloway 1995: 171)

This is not to say that the divide between subjectivity and objectivity, or the seemingly self-determining structures of capital, don’t exist, or exist only ideally, or can only be overridden ideally by education, or correct thought or the like. These processes are real enough. But it is to ask what is the social constitution, the human content, of such forms. This, I think, is the basis for criticism founded upon understanding the creative power of human practice as a constitutive social relation. Criticism in this mode is not an objective, autonomous realm occupied by a few with
a specialised understanding of the world (critic, artist, theorist, academic, revolutionary), but a creative activity that 'seeks to understand social phenomena in terms of human creativity and the forms in which creativity exists’ (Holloway 2002: 71).

Creativity here is the creativity of human practice, of purposeful activity, not a reified creativity hived off as an object of study, or formulated as pre-existing quality for an innovation economy. Criticism is the analysis of, resistance to, and search for the constitutive social relations, the human content of the seemingly self-determining autonomous forms that constrain and drive our activity. As Holloway suggests:

It is better therefore to assume from the beginning that criticism of society must also be criticism of ourselves, that struggle against capitalism must be also struggle against the ‘we’ not only against but in capitalism. To criticise is to recognise that we are a divided self. To criticise society is to criticise our own complicity in the reproduction of that society. (2002: 72)

If capital, in other words, demands an objectivised subjectivity, then criticism, as creative practice, as a movement against negation of purposeful activity, must seek to understand the social constitution of the seemingly autonomous structures that frame the debate of creative research.

Rethinking subjectivity

These reconfigurations of creativity and criticism have, no doubt, implications for the institutional frameworks and research accountabilities that overarch debates about creative research, and more importantly the nature of the labour that is involved in creative research and the academy as a whole. However, leaving these aside here, it seems to me that some of the struggles that pervade creative research discourse are in many cases admirably resisting and contesting not only the grounds of the debate, but also its underlying notions of subjectivity (and of labour).

As I have said above, in contesting traditional notions of research, creative research is advocating for something new. In bourgeois terms, this newness takes the form of underpinning innovation and of harnessing and disciplining various human activities for the purposes of economic development. However, as we have seen above, creative research is sometimes struggling to define subjectivity beyond this instrumental utopia.

As I have suggested, this subjectivity is one that emphasises practical activity; that accepts uncertainty of outcomes; that valorises particularity over homogeneity and quality over quantity; and, most importantly, that doesn’t devalue subjectivity as a mode of existence. However, resolution of these values often takes the form of a struggle between autonomy and structure which only strengthens the fragmentary social world that is premise and outcome of capitalist social relations. This includes the hard dualism of subjectivity and objectivity, of knowledge and being. Accepting that this struggle is insoluble on its own terms and looking for the constitutive relationship of seemingly autonomous forms is part of what I mean by critique.
We can now begin to outline a basis for creative research as a return of subjectivity that exceeds its transcendental form, while trying to address the suspicion with which subjectivity as a category is seen in its postmodern and post/structuralist variants.

What the above suggests is a re-understanding of the fragmentary nature of postmodern subjectivity as a critical/creative subjectivity that is in (there is no position outside of society, no objective stance) and against (critical in the sense of an understanding of the ‘human content of seemingly autonomous forms’). It seeks to emphasise creative human practice as a premise of capitalist society in the mode of being denied. It seeks, as I have suggested above, moving beyond what exists. The outcome of this movement beyond, however, should not be presupposed. We can, through criticism as human practice, project what is beyond against what exists (indeed this is the implication of Marx’s definition of human practice), but we can never be certain of what that outcome might be. (‘Utopias’, as T.J. Clark tells us, ‘reassure modernity as to its infinite potential’ (Clark 2012: 63).) Resistance, as movement against what is, as critique of what is, is the only immediate possibility (Holloway 2002: 128-31). This is a subjectivity that is constituted by practice as creative: in that it is based on practical activity; critical: in that it seeks human content as an internal relationship of, rather than between, seemingly autonomous forms. This is a subjectivity that marginalises the concentration on the object found in most expressions of research, realising that only subjectivity as human practice is constitutive of objective forms under capital in the mode of being denied.

This moves beyond trying to conceive of relations between sites and structures, of valorising epistemology as the sole product of creative research and practice, or of seeing creative research as a functional machine from which innovation erupts to aid capitalist productivity. Creative research, in my view, is a critical/creative practice that seeks to re-envision social relations. These are the radical possibilities that creative research might develop, and develop on its own terms.

Endnotes

1. For discussions of the disciplining of universities by state and market see Caffentzis (1975), Harvie (2000) and Pinxten (2012).

2. For example, Eagleton 2005 traces the rise of criticism in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries as a public discourse against absolutism, and its subsequent engagement in ‘the public sphere’. Note also Eagleton’s (2004) analysis of the rise of cultural theory against a backdrop of Marxist enquiry and the contemporary history of 1965-1980.

3. This contemporary rethinking of subjectivity and the re-emergence of the subject are also noted in Gratton (2000) and Stirmer (2010). The re-emergence of the subject in Marxian terms is advocated for in Holloway (2002).

4. Media articles on whether creative writing should be taught are often framed by the idea that the success of a creative writing program is measured by its published alumni, e.g. Menand (2009).
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