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Between architecture and language as ‘form of life’

Abstract:

Ludwig Wittgenstein’s philosophical writing is characterized by two main books, both acknowledged as major philosophical breakthroughs of the twentieth century: *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (1922), and *Philosophical Investigations* (published posthumously in 1953). Between these two texts, there is a shift in Wittgenstein’s thought on the structure and use of language, which is made evident by his decision to forego the idea of ‘pictorial form’ in favor of ‘life form.’ This transition, which allowed for a new understanding of the relation between the ethical and aesthetic aspects of Wittgenstein’s thought, greatly influenced Paul Engelmann’s understanding of architectural space. Following Wittgenstein’s writing, Engelmann claims that the concepts of ‘the beautiful’ and ‘the good’ are closely related, resulting in a distinct connection between what is beautiful and the concept of ‘form of life.’ In light of the influence that Wittgenstein’s writing had on Engelmann’s architecture, this paper examines the relation between architecture and language as ‘form of life,’ a connection which is suggested in Engelmann’s lecture ‘How to Build in the Kibbutz?’ in which Engelmann uses the term ‘form of life’ in reference to Wittgenstein’s writing on language.

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Preface

From 1926-1928 the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein designed and built a house in Vienna for his sister, Margaret Stonborough-Wittgenstein. He worked on this project in collaboration with his friend, the architect and student of Adolf Loos, Paul Engelmann.¹ Although Engelmann was originally commissioned to do the design, Wittgenstein became part of the planning process following Loos' recommendation.² Engelmann and Wittgenstein first met in 1916 in the architect's hometown of Olomouc, Moravia where Wittgenstein trained to be an artillery officer during the First World War. The discussions that ensued between them in Olomouc and subsequently in Vienna revolved around the essential question of a proper and meaningful way of life, a common concern that eventually became the foundation for their architectural collaboration a decade later.

Two important books characterize Wittgenstein's philosophical writing: *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (1921) and *Philosophical Investigations* (1953), which was published posthumously. Both books were considered major philosophical milestones at the time of their publications. Many scholars maintain that together they outline an important evolution in Wittgenstein's philosophy. *Philosophical Investigations* introduced a significant shift in the way Wittgenstein thought about the structure and use of language. His attention to expressions of style³ and gesture testifies to a shift in his intellectual path, which began with the concept of 'pictorial form' and evolved into a concern for 'form of life.' In his attempt to reorient the relationship between language and the world, Wittgenstein argues against the claim that grammar reflects the structure of the world and that definitions act as mediators between language and reality. According to his argument, language is not a fixed structure imposed on the world, but rather an adaptable structure that derives meaning from its use in real world situations or 'ways of living.'

This new emphasis on a more expansive understanding of meaning, i.e., meaning that emerges from particular real-world contexts, contrasted with the limited scope of meaning associated with scientific rationalism. This in turn fostered new connections between language, ethics, and aesthetics. These newly delineated ethical and aesthetic dimensions of language had a significant influence on the field of architecture through the work of Paul Engelmann. Engelmann borrowed the concept of 'life form' from Wittgenstein's philosophy, and it served as a central force in shaping his concept of architecture. In philosophical discourse philosophers such as Kant and Schopenhauer ranked architecture at the bottom of the hierarchy of the arts because of its utilitarian essence. However, this is exactly why Engelmann values architecture: in both reflecting and developing 'forms of life' architecture provides a place for human activities to unfold.

From 'Pictorial Form' to 'Form of Life' in Wittgenstein's Thought

Although the phrase 'form of life' appears infrequently in *Philosophical Investigations*,⁴ the rate at which it is used is unrelated to its importance for understanding Wittgenstein's later work. In fact, it could be said that his later philosophy was largely a reaction to an amended position he held vis-à-vis the notion of 'form of life,' which asserted that language must be perceived and studied as integral to the 'form of life' on which linguistic meaning and comprehension both depend. In order to fully appreciate the implications of this shift in emphasis, it is first

necessary to review the central claims of his early philosophy as delineated in the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*.

The Logico-Philosophical Treatise and the Pictorial Model

Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus was the only book that Wittgenstein published during his lifetime. This brief essay is considered one of the most important philosophical texts of the twentieth century. The book is composed of seven numbered propositions, each followed by sub-sections that elaborate on it.

In the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein argues that in order for language to represent meaning, for it to represent the state of affairs, there must be something in common between the sentences and the state of affairs. The key to understanding Wittgenstein's point of view is the picture theory of language (2013: 2.11, 2.151, 2.17, 2.173). According to this theory, a proposition is a picture of a situation. It is a reflection of one structure (the world) in another structure (language). In other words, every meaningful sentence corresponds to a possible fact. Wittgenstein sought to divert attention away from the 'surface' of the phrases we use, which he believed obscured the logical structure of the proposition. He thought that we should focus on 'deep phrases' that allow us to determine the elementary phrases in language. By means of this revelation he sought to reach an understanding of the exact relationship between the structure of the phrase and the structure of the fact. According to early Wittgenstein, meaningful discussions of the world can be broken down into elementary statements that constitute images of possible states of affairs. Language only has a precise meaning when it is used for making arguments. In other words, language is only meaningful when it is used to make factual determinations.⁵ The metaphysical image that arises in the *Tractatus* is of a world assembled from simple and interrelated facts, and language is thus a tool of thought whose purpose is to determine facts by imagining or creating their pictorial representation. Therefore, language maintains a structural similarity to what it is describing.

One of the fundamental arguments in the *Tractatus* is that in order to represent a state of affairs a picture must have the same form as the reality that it depicts. This is what Wittgenstein calls 'pictorial form.' In this respect, a statement is also a picture. It is important to remember that a picture, according to Wittgenstein's argument, is not an object (which is how we tend to think of pictures). Rather, a picture is itself a fact. Questions that might arise from this argument include: What does a certain situation (certain fact) do to a picture? Moreover, what does any given picture *do* to a picture of a specific situation?

Wittgenstein attempts to answer these two questions by uniting them. He argues, therefore, that the first question cannot be answered without answering the second. For 'x' to be a picture, it must be a picture of 'y.' It is only possible for 'x' to represent 'y' if there is a correlation between the two variables. This correlation is called a 'pictorial relationship' (Wittgenstein 2013: 2.1514). This relationship must, however, be such that the pictorial structure 'x' will represent the object 'y' and this requires that they have a common pictorial form, or as Wittgenstein wrote: 'What a picture must have in common with reality in order to be able to depict it – correctly or incorrectly – in the way that it does, is its pictorial form' (2013: 2.17). This is the argument that stands at the basis of the statement that a picture of a fact must be a fact itself. This move implies that there is no such thing as a mere picture; the essence of a

picture is determined and directed by it being a picture of a state of affairs. This is what Wittgenstein means when he argues that the pictorial relationship is contained in the picture, and this is what makes it a picture (2013: 2.1513). The relationship between the picture and what is in the picture is an internal relationship. It is not retroactively determined between two givens (a thing and a picture); rather, it is what constitutes the picture itself.

It is often said that Wittgenstein was very impressed with a trip he took to a courtroom where lawyers reconstructed a car accident by placing toy cars on a desk. What Wittgenstein most likely found impressive about this courtroom situation was not that the spectators had to interpret that toy car 'a' represented real car 'a' and that toy car 'b' represented real car 'b.' What he found impressive was that the courtroom table was perceived as a picture of the actual accident. Since this was the case, all of the details about the model on the table had already been determined by the accident. Therefore, it would have been unnecessary to say, for example, that the movement of the toy car on the courtroom table represented the movement of the real car. And this is more sharply true in the context of 'linguistic pictures.' According to Wittgenstein: 'A proposition shows its sense. A proposition shows how things stand if it is true. And it says that they do so stand' (2013: 4.022). When determining what 'x,' 'y,' and 'f' represent, we are in fact determining what the statement/picture 'xyf' says. Not only is there no need for this to be explained to us, in principle it is impossible. The statement is what it says. Moreover, the fact that it is what it says reveals itself in the statement. In order to understand a statement, we must know the situation that it represents (Wittgenstein 2013: 4.021). The central argument in the *Tractatus* is that the only way to understand this is by knowing that the picture and the pictured situation share something in common, which determines the internal relationship between them:

The fact that the elements of a picture are related to one another in a determinate way represents that things are related to one another in the same way. Let us call this connexion of its elements the structure of the picture, and let us call the possibility of this structure the pictorial form of the picture. (Wittgenstein: 2013: 2.015)

The picture (the statement) and the pictured situation (the presented situation – the meaning of the sentence) all have the same 'pictorial form.'

Wittgenstein emphasizes the internal relationship between the statement and a situation:

A proposition communicates a situation to us, and so it must be essentially connected with the situation. And the connection is precisely that it is its logical picture. A proposition states something only in so far as it is a picture. (2013: 4.031)

Here he determines the realistic, central facet of the representative and pictorial theory presented in the *Tractatus*. The statement, the thought, and the picture are inter-directional: they are, in essence, directed to the world 'represented' through them. In other words, there is an internal, essential, and direct connection between them.

In *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein holds the view that in many cases the meaning of an expression, word, sentence, dialect, proverb, etc. is not what it is thought to be, but rather its meaning is derived from its actual utilization, which Wittgenstein calls 'the language game'. Words derive their meanings when they are used in particular contexts. When words are used in different contexts, they have different meanings.

It should be noted that the *Tractatus* and *Philosophical Investigations* differ on many levels. Not only are the contents of the books different, but also the manner in which they were written. According to some commentators, the change in writing style and the renunciation of the ‘diamond’ structure in favor of a freer structure indicates a radical change in Wittgenstein’s position on the connection between the world and the way it is represented by thought. Wittgenstein abandoned the position argued in the *Tractatus* that the world is a totally objective entity, that it can be thought about, and that thought is a picture of reality. In *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein no longer thinks that the meaning of words is simply derived from what they reference in the world. Rather, thought, what we think and express in language, is woven into a relatively autonomous linguistic gamut (relative to the world). Meaning is assigned to words through their tasks, i.e., the manner in which we use them. The same word may, in fact, have different tasks, and therefore different meanings in different ‘language games.’ Language creates reality, and the idea that there is a reality unto itself (without thinking of it) is a meaningless illusion.

Wittgenstein clearly states in *Philosophical Investigations* that he sought to correct the mode of thought presented in the *Tractatus* by advocating that ‘to imagine a language means to imagine a form of life’ (1968: 8). He, therefore, abandoned his previous claim that there is a perfect scientific language for describing the world, arguing instead that language is a non-specific system of social activities, each designed to serve a different purpose. Wittgenstein called the differentiated ways language is used ‘language games.’⁶

Wittgenstein’s revised definition of language emphasizes that humans are linguistic creatures, and it goes on to underscore the connection between philosophy and the role that language plays in human life. In this context, philosophical problems arise when a language game becomes dysfunctional. This dysfunction is ultimately symptomatic of flawed ways of living. In his writing, Wittgenstein emphasizes the concept of ‘perspicuous representation’ (1968: 122).⁷ In order to live an ethical life, the individual must focus on philosophical activities characterized by the values of perspicuity and honesty.

In *Culture and Value* Wittgenstein draws an analogy between philosophy and architecture. He says that architectural work, like philosophical work, is a reflexive undertaking (1984: 16). Thus architecture and philosophy are not merely matters of understanding. The philosopher, like the architect, must forgo confusion or personal inclinations to achieve perspicuity and honesty, an idea that emphasizes the ethical dimension of these fields. The investigation, which primarily seeks to characterize the use of words and imagery, draws attention to the ‘form’ of human life that manifests itself in human concepts, costumes, and activities. The ultimate objective of the text is to restore the equity between the self, others, and the world.

Philosophical Investigations makes use of examples and ‘language games’. Therefore, when a reader does not understand an example, she is called to re-read the text and exercise what it refers to. In this respect the text is analogous to art. Think for example about literary writing which embodies the meaning and value of a particular life, which is also an ethical praxis. Writing style presents truth in a way that scientific objectivity cannot. Positivism reduces the world to a container for objects. It understands properties as external relationships between objects. Although Wittgenstein does not object to science or technological development, his objection is to the claim that the individual can be reduced to a deterministic system. The unique

everyday experience of the individual is eradicated by mechanistic explanations. In his writing, he calls for an artistic ‘ethos’ that seeks to restore the connection between the individual, the other, and the world. The culture Wittgenstein aspires to is one that values art over science, where artwork reflects ethics.

Wittgenstein introduces the term ‘form of life’ for the first time in Section 19 of *Philosophical Investigations*, where it appears in the context of using language at a construction site, thereby linking it, albeit analogically, to architecture. The builders communicate by ordering materials such as bricks, pillars, plates and rods.⁸ In this section he argues that in order to reach a correct conception of language, one simply needs to observe its use in real life, to notice what people actually do with words. The second appearance of the term ‘form of life’ comes alongside the key term ‘language game,’ which he uses to highlight the fact that speaking a language is part of an activity or ‘form of life.’ Wittgenstein writes: ‘Here the term ‘language game’ is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the ‘speaking’ of language is part of an activity, or form of life’ (1968: 23). We should not assume that the nature of language could be clarified independent of its concrete use. As stated previously, language for Wittgenstein is no longer what it had been in his earlier work: a system of propositions that are pictures of states of affairs in the world.⁹ In this section of *Philosophical Investigations*, the uses of language are different and they are woven into different activities, different life forms, in which human beings are involved. Significantly, in this section Wittgenstein highlights the diversity of language games and it seems that ‘forms of life’ are also characterized by the same diversity.

The term ‘forms of life’ appears for the third time in Section 241, when he discusses what people agree upon when they talk. Is agreement in language based on an appropriate description of the facts as asserted in the *Tractatus*, or is it based on the manner of usage, the agreement between participants of a language game in which speakers use a particular dialogue in a particular situation? According to Wittgenstein, ‘what is true or false is what human beings say; and it is in their language that human beings agree. This is agreement not in opinions, but rather in form of life’ (1968: 88). Thus, a language game must adjust to the form of life in which it takes place. Moreover, the form of life establishes an entire culture, a mode of meaning in which language unfolds. It is difficult, if not impossible, for people that do not share a form of life to understand the meaning of what is said. In this sense, form of life is associated with a worldview. It establishes the human world and its conceptual framework.

Stonborough House

The experience Wittgenstein acquired while working on the Stonborough House was fundamental for his evolving conception of the relationship between architecture and language. Furthermore, it can be seen as a gateway leading from the *Tractatus* to his later philosophy of language elaborated in *Philosophical Investigations*. Although Paul Engelmann drafted the first construction sketches of the Stonborough house without Wittgenstein’s cooperation (Figures 1, 2), over the course of its design and construction Wittgenstein’s role grew to the point that he ousted Engelmann and effectively took control of the project. During the initial planning stage, Wittgenstein sought to build purely and display minimal units of the architectural language. But only as a result of his collaboration with Engelmann was Wittgenstein able to understand that the significance of




Figure 1 (left) Stonborough House, sketches drafted by Engelmann, 1929; Figure 2 (right) Stonborough House, by Ludwig Wittgenstein, Vienna, 1929

the house is not revealed by the image it presents from the exterior; rather, it comes into focus only when a person imagines the house as the space where actual life takes place. Thus, if these minimal units are to have any meaning whatsoever they must establish the rooms and areas in the house as being different and separate while at the same time being part of a complete form of life. Paul Wijdeveld, writing about this house, states that Wittgenstein needed to consider his sister's luxurious lifestyle in his design. In discussions with Engelmann, the question of architecture's ability to express an aristocratic form of life arose. Engelmann expressed serious doubts in response to this question (Wijdeveld 2000: 79-117). From the architectural standpoint we can see the structure not just as an object with functional properties or aesthetic qualities but as the object of an act that expresses a form of life through the ethos of the structure. In this context ethos echoes the original meaning of the Greek *ethos*, which is a natural habitat or home to which animals or human beings return, not just in the literal sense of a dwelling, but as a habitat, a living environment, a place where people can reside and be 'at home' in the deeper philosophical sense.

It is important to emphasize that for Wittgenstein theoretical understanding alone is insufficient to properly comprehend form of life. A full understanding can only be achieved if the thought process itself is realized.¹⁰ In other words, philosophical knowledge cannot be an end in itself; it needs to be applied. For both Wittgenstein and Engelmann, Stonborough House provided a practical arena in which the central question of architecture's ability to reflect a proper and fully meaningful life from an ethical perspective could be tested. The correspondence between them from that period, the termination of their collaboration on the project, and the eventual cessation of their friendship reveal that this question remained unanswered for a long time.¹¹

It is possible that Stonborough House is the first step in the development of Wittgenstein's philosophy after *Tractatus*. It is not totally coincidental then that it developed from a project that is also an *act*. In *Tractatus*, the central image is 'mirroring' and concepts like 'picture' and 'picturing' are central to the main arguments presented in the text. Architecture mirrors nothing. Like the novelist that presents the form of life of her protagonist by writing about, and thus, creating the setting in which the form of life of the novel unfolds, architects, through the act of design, create the setting and thus the foundation for the form of life of the building's inhabitants. This house, in fact, should be interpreted in light of Wittgenstein's

comments on aesthetics. It is a home, a dwelling, a residence for people within the world; it is not a monument but a form of life.

Style and Gesture

Sometime between 1932 and 1934, Wittgenstein commented on architecture and said: ‘Remember the impression one gets from good architecture, that it expresses a thought. It makes one want to respond with a gesture’ (1984: 22e). A decade later he expanded and illuminated his position by stating that ‘architecture is a gesture. Not every purposive movement of the human body is a gesture. And no more is every building designed for a purpose architecture’ (1984: 42e). Before engaging with the question of how architecture is a gesture, we must first consider how the concept of a gesture relates to style and language in Wittgenstein’s thought.

The process by which Wittgenstein’s understanding of language – and from the quotation above his understanding of architecture – changed from a picture theory of language to a language game conception led him to the notion of a gesture. Although Wittgenstein extensively investigated the meaning of gestures, his central claim remained the same: a gesture constitutes a meaningful act of communication. In general, we can say that verbal gestures express meaning through the role of language as determined by tone, style and rhythm, all of which add fundamentally important information to what is being expressed. Verbal gestures involve multilayered experiences of meaning. In this way gestures influence how we interpret words, how we hear the words that are being expressed.¹² Furthermore, verbal gestures do not inherently need justification or explanation; they seem to have their own system of logic, or what Wittgenstein calls an ‘experience of meaning itself,’ which is why we can only perform verbal gestures through expressive modes. Wittgenstein assumes that some people lack the sensitivity necessary for experiencing meaning. This distinction is related to the understanding that participation in a common form of life is a precondition for language games to be meaningful. If form of life constitutes culture, then it constitutes a horizon of meaning. For those that do not share a form of life, it is difficult, or impossible, to understand the meaning of language because it is connected with *ethos* and worldview.

At this point, the concept of *Geistesgeschichte* comes into play. In the tradition of the history of ideas, style is regarded as an expression of worldview, as a form of life. Wittgenstein understands the concept of style in the same way. In the transition from pictorial form to form of life, Wittgenstein views life as the substratum of the structure and uses of language. Life manifests itself in the prism of language through style. Style thereby infuses speech and expression with life. Since we speak and write in our own style, each person reveals his or her attitude toward life and the world, which in turn indicates an ethical perspective. Style, therefore, expresses ethical values through aesthetic form.

Architecture – Aesthetics and Ethics

For Wittgenstein architecture and philosophy are closely related. Their proximity is derived from their shared reliance on the concept of form of life. Unlike Kant and Schopenhauer, Wittgenstein does not consider the architectural object to be an aesthetic object in the sense of a work of art. For Wittgenstein it is not something that contains aesthetic qualities. Kant, Schopenhauer, and their successors believed that

architecture was too closely related to practical matters. Kant called this ‘dependent beauty’ (Kant 2001: 53)¹³. Furthermore, it is the material character of architecture that affords it such a low status in determining its place in the hierarchy of the arts. For Kant, it does not even maintain the additional condition that artistic creativity must maintain; it is not free from interest. In fact, it is dependent on interest. Wittgenstein in contrast thought of the architectural work as an object to which one relates to from the perspective of utilization, which is to say that he saw it as an act closely connected to its utility as a place of residence and an important component for the development of lifestyles. Placing the emphasis on ways of living and on lifestyles emphasizes the architectural object’s situatedness in the world, and its significance in the world (if we think for example of Kant’s sublime).

In a text from 1933 entitled *Lectures on Aesthetics*, Wittgenstein discusses beauty and proclaims that it is a pointless concept, like any other aesthetic adjective. Moreover, language games in art are not disengaged from other language games. It follows that aesthetic issues should be investigated from a perspective that allows for the examination of their context, in other words, from within a form of life. An example of such an examination can be seen when Wittgenstein investigates an architectural act:

Architecture: – draw a door– ‘slightly too large.’ You might say: ‘He has an excellent eye for measurement.’ No – he sees it hasn’t the Right expression – it doesn’t make the right gesture. (1972: 31)

The words we use to create an expression of aesthetic judgment play a clear role. To describe their usage one must describe the culture, the form of life. Subsequently, he raises questions that discuss dimension, such as: What is the correct height or width of the door or the window? The person from the quote making the hypothetical judgment concluded that the door was not the proper size in relation to a system of aesthetic rules of construction. The architect does not necessarily need to consider beauty or aesthetic qualities because the architectural object is intended, first and foremost, to be lived in. It should be made to complement a form of life. It can be judged beautiful or ugly only in relation to a particular lifestyle or form of life.

Engelmann, in his book *Letters from Ludwig Wittgenstein*, writes that the seeds of this thought can be found in the *Tractatus* where Wittgenstein argues: ‘Ethics and aesthetics are one and the same’ (2013: 6.421). Engelmann believed that most commentators of Wittgenstein’s work misunderstood this argument. He argued that Wittgenstein did not consider ethics and aesthetics equivalent. In fact, Engelmann was perplexed that commentators would think it would even be possible to assume that a profound and radical thinker like Wittgenstein would maintain that there is no difference between ethics and aesthetics. Engelmann adds the following reminder to his argument:

[...]to the understanding reader an insight which he is *assumed* to possess in any case. Seen from a different angle, the insight into the fundamental connection between aesthetics (logic as well, it would appear) and ethics ...the morality of an artist is vital to his work. (1967: 125-26)

Further along in the text Engelmann contends, based on his understanding of Wittgenstein’s argument regarding the relationship between ethics and aesthetics, that neither art nor architecture needs to produce new forms of things, just as there is no need to create new philosophical systems. Instead, they must express the spirit of a lifestyle, or form of life. The relation between the architectural object and beauty –

the aesthetics of the structure – should not be understood, according to Engelmann, in relation to the architectural object's decorative or aesthetic properties. The beauty of the architectural object arises, rather, from activity and praxis. In other words, he thinks that architecture is only beautiful if it is useful. Thus, he relates the beautiful to the good. This point unveils the ethical dimension of the architectural object as an ethos, a way of life, and a custom.

Paul Engelmann (1891-1965)

Born in 1891 in Olomouc, Moravia, Paul Engelmann was an architect who worked primarily in his hometown and in Vienna. Engelmann himself acknowledged how his years in Vienna (1909-1934) were marked by the considerable influence of Adolf Loos, first as his senior student and later as a partner and colleague in Loos' atelier. Loos greatly influenced Engelmann's thinking and provided him with the opportunity to share and discuss his architectural and philosophical insights.¹⁴ And much like others of his generation and milieu who were forced to emigrate, Engelmann combined his work as an architectural practitioner with critical and philosophical writing.¹⁵

In 1934, Engelmann left Vienna and settled in Tel-Aviv. During this time his activity as an architect markedly diminished, as attested to by a wealth of existing sketches and initial building plans for structures that were never built. Even though it is difficult to formulate a unified developmental line, it seems that Engelmann's architectural practice in Israel can best be characterized as a unique synthesis of his own ideas and those of Loos. His work mainly focused on the notion of three-dimensional planning (*Raumplanung*), while attempting to create furniture and architecture suitable for an Israeli form of life (*Lebensform*). Additionally, Engelmann wrote about a wide range of literary, cultural, and philosophical topics. Moreover, he was particularly interested in disseminating Loos' ideas and Wittgenstein's understanding of 'form of life' to the Israeli audience, primarily through two texts: a lecture that was delivered in front of members of a kibbutz – 'The Kibbutz Lecture' – and a collection of papers and interpretations that were edited and published in by Engelmann together with the philosopher Josef Schächter under the Hebrew title, *Signon Emet (Real Style)*, in memory of Adolf Loos.

Residential Apartments in the Kibbutz

It was in pre-state Israel that Engelmann discovered a novel way to connect two concepts integral to his thinking: his notion of style, which he derived from the thought of Loos, and form of life, which originated in his discussions with Wittgenstein. For Engelmann, these concepts constitute the connection between the concrete dimension of the architectural object and the abstract dimension of language.

Sometime towards the end of the 1930s or early 1940s, Engelmann traveled from Tel Aviv to a kibbutz¹⁶ where he lectured to its members on the relationship between architecture and dwelling as forms of life.¹⁷ In 'The Kibbutz Lecture,' Engelmann wrote: 'In our generation we are now standing at a crossroads. We are all, each of us, this kibbutz, the entire kibbutz society, the workers' movement in Israel, all over the world, all of humanity [at a crossroads]' (p.16) (Figure 3).




Figure 3. Engelmann's Kibbutz lecture, page 16.

With these words, Engelmann tried to make the audience of kibbutz members aware of the critical choice that lay ahead of their community, which also offered a unique opportunity for effecting significant change in architectural design in general. In the lecture Engelmann drew upon his ongoing and deep philosophical and theoretical engagement with both Loos' and Wittgenstein's thought in order to present a new synthesis, which embodied his own conception of dwelling as a form of life.

To elucidate what he meant by 'crossroads,' Engelmann offered a comparison between the two periods of collective settlement in pre-state Israel. He claimed that during the first period, the era of the establishment of the kibbutzim, pioneers were preoccupied with the question of how to construct the kibbutz. This discussion did not focus on aesthetic considerations, nor did it consider questions of convenience or well-being; rather, it revolved around how to construct a space that would correspond with a specific worldview. The second period began, according to Engelmann, after the kibbutzim were already well established, both physically and economically. This new social and economic situation afforded the kibbutz members the opportunity to deal with issues of well-being and the possibility of 'providing the public and private places with some kind of beauty.' Engelmann then pointedly turned to his audience and asked: 'Which among the periods of construction is the most beautiful?' To which he offered the following answer: 'Perhaps the newer houses are more suited for their purpose, but undoubtedly the old Spartan huts from the first period are more beautiful' (1946b: 17). Significantly, Engelmann's lecture constructs an unbreakable link between notions of beauty, goodness, and form of life within the kibbutz context, which for Engelmann represented a collective society characterized by a shared ideology and worldview. Engelmann's lecture begs the question: What is the relationship between philosophy and architecture? For Engelmann, the relationship is fundamentally ethical. He thought that ethics was essentially the way human beings exist in the world, how they are positioned and located in the world in relation to different things. Construction in general, and in the context of the kibbutzim in particular, signified the possibility of formulating a common ethos, an ethos of community. The ethical question posed in his lecture is quite clear: How can architectural expression be consistent with a form of life that characterizes a period and a society?

The Atrium

In 1946, alongside his Hebrew translation of Loos' *Real Style* (Figure 4), Engelmann published an important architectural essay entitled 'Courtyard Houses' (1946a: 18).¹⁸ This short essay offers an important example of Engelmann's efforts to translate theoretical concepts into real architectural practices. In 'Courtyard Houses' (Figure 5) Engelmann proposed basing a new building typology on the integration of an atrium into the existing courtyard house design, a model he claimed reflected 'the spirit of Loos' while at the same time demonstrating an affiliation to the historical forms of architecture in Mediterranean countries (1946b: 16). Engelmann proposed thinking about the internal courtyard as an existing building type that was suited to the Israeli form of life.¹⁹ One of the design questions that preoccupied Engelmann most while he was studying under and later working for Loos more than a decade earlier was the structure of the atrium.²⁰ Historically, the atrium was a central space in the Roman villa that was open to the sky and surrounded by a covered walkway that allowed access to various parts of the house. Moreover, the atrium was of great importance in the life of the Roman household, sometimes containing a small cappella in which statues of idols or ancestors were placed. More often, though, it was used for entertaining, thereby constituting the social centre of the dwelling.



Figure 4 (left) The cover of the book: Adolf Loos, *Real Style*; Figure 5 (right) *Courtyard Houses*

Engelmann thought that this structure was appropriate for the Israeli context, not merely as a historical form or as a solution to particular climate concerns, but more importantly as a symbolic and ethical choice because it is open to the outside, to things that may occur. Engelmann refers to his proposed new typology in 'The Kibbutz Lecture' during his discussion of appropriate forms of living in Israel.²¹ He argued that in the new typology every building embodies the form of life inside of it, which, in turn, makes it an ethical and aesthetically proper architectural conception.

Architecture and Language as Form of Life

This paper opened with a sketch of the deep and mutual intellectual relationship between Ludwig Wittgenstein and Paul Engelmann. It focused on their intellectual exchanges regarding form of life. The influence that each figure had on the other is mutual. Wittgenstein's writing and discussions of language were influenced by Engelmann's architecture, and Engelmann's architectural thought, in turn, was influenced by Wittgenstein's philosophy of language. Although the *Tractatus* seems more architectural than *Philosophical Investigations*, most likely because it abides to a rigidly ordered format consisting of structured sections, it sets forth a purely two-dimensional order consisting of a correlation between language, meaning, and place. In the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein's understanding of language seems to position the reader above and outside of language, as if she were not part of the linguistic system and was simply looking down at it from above. From this viewpoint, the limitations of language are exposed as spatial limits and in Wittgenstein's words, 'the limits of my language mean the limits of my world' (2013: 5.61). As a result, 'the subject does not belong to the world: rather, it is a limit of the world' (2013: 5.632). In contrast, in *Philosophical Investigations* Wittgenstein writes from a point of view that grounds his philosophy in the world. In other words, he re-conceptualizes philosophy as inhabitation. Here he argues that language arises from everyday practices, such as those that take place on the construction site. These practices consist of simple language based on a series of four words. This is the first model for the use of language. It emphasizes that language is a 'spatial and temporal phenomenon' and not a 'non-spatial, non-temporal phantasm' (1968: 108).

The main issue presented in Engelmann's 'Courtyard Houses' and in 'The Kibbutz Lecture' is how to build. A ready-made solution for this problem is not available. Nonetheless, he urged that:

It is nonetheless possible[...]and I strive with all my might to awaken the recognition in your souls, the option that in order to overcome all of these difficulties because that depends on the correct solution of this problem throughout life.... (1948a: 10)

Engelmann contends that both the individual and the community as a collective must decide how they would like to position themselves in the world at the historical moment in which they exist, and determine what connections they wish to establish, both with the place in which they reside and with their neighbors. Before we can know how to build, we must first answer the question: How should we exist in the world? In the words of Engelmann:

Only you know...you reside therein. They are forms of your life... built in the future but only by the form of your lives, and you will have a secret and beauty in the future too.... To acquire this culture is not a simple thing to do; in the first place it is not only an intellectual role, rather, much more of a moral one.... It is a long and difficult road, and each individual must take that road by himself. (1948b: 7)

For Engelmann (in architecture), as for Wittgenstein (in language), responding to the form of life is fundamentally an ethical and aesthetic endeavor.

Engelmann's kibbutz lecture is closely related to Wittgenstein's writing on philosophical activity and language as a form of life because architectural design, like philosophical arguments, is itself a form of life. In his critique, Engelmann relates architectural expression to language, arguing, perhaps paradoxically, that the modern state is characterized by an inability to distinguish right from wrong. This 'confusion' is expressed in the deterioration of architectural expression as well as the deterioration

of language. In his lecture, he emphasizes that a Zionist architectural culture, especially kibbutz culture, which is the authentic expression of Zionism, must be developed out of ‘the little things in life’ and not ‘the academy’.

Following Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language, Engelmann emphasizes that bad architecture is symptomatic of a flawed form of life. There is an inherent connection between architecture and the way one uses it, its qualities in the pragmatic sense. The architectural object is closely related to the possibilities of living inherent to the form of life in which it is situated. Similarly, in *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein makes a connection between the philosophical text and architecture as a form of life. He claims that both depend on culture. The emphasis on forms of life stresses the importance of place for the architectural object. Buildings are embedded in the world; therefore, a building’s meaning is always related to the place where it is located.

Departing from Wittgenstein’s influence, Engelmann relates architectural practice to critical writing and contemplation. As an architect, only a few of his plans were ever built.²² The few buildings that were constructed, however, should be thought of as precursors to, or early examples of post-modern architecture because they reflect the importance of cultural, social and ethical considerations in the construction of space, and favor them over objective, utopian and ideological considerations.

In the ‘Kibbutz Lecture,’ Engelmann presents the foundation for his ‘post-modern’ architectural style. As I suggested in this paper, Wittgenstein and Engelmann both saw writing, as well as philosophical and architectural work, as activities that derive their meaning from our shared forms of life. For Engelmann both disciplines – building and writing – are parallel fields that support one another and reveal the world as a form of life. Engelmann’s reference to the audience of his lecture is equivalent to his reference to architects. In this respect, he relates to his audience like Wittgenstein relates to the reader of his text. With this, he offered an alternative architectural outlook, which has been described here as an anti-academic and anti-historicist imperative to build from the ‘bottom-up.’ He emphasized that, just like the writer and the philosopher, the architect must understand that form should be dictated by use and culture.

Endnotes

¹ To date, three monographs have been published examining this house from an architectural and historical point of view: Leitner 1973; Wijdeveld 1994; Leitner 2000.

² In a letter Engelmann wrote to Friedrich von Hayek he described Wittgenstein’s involvement in the design of Stonborough House:

Ludwig Wittgenstein, who was teaching at that time, was very interested in this project and when he was in Vienna, gave such excellent advice...yet the result of this cooperation was not truly satisfactory. For that reason, and because he found himself in a deep emotional crisis ...I proposed to him that he carry out the building plans together with me and...he accepted...From that moment he was the actual architect, not I, and though the plans were ready when he joined the undertaking, I regard the result as his achievement, not mine.
(Wijdeveld 2000: 53)

³ For more on the question of style in Wittgenstein’s writings see Manfred 1992.

⁴ The expression form of life appears three times in the first part of the book.

⁵ His position here is very close in terms of content to Bertrand Russell's logical atomism. See Russell 1954.

⁶ Wittgenstein mentions a long list of different language games. (1968: §23). Significantly, he does not entirely dismiss the possibility of using pictorial language to describe the world, rather, alongside such possibilities as giving orders, commands, requests, thanks, well-wishes, prayers and so forth it becomes one of the various uses of language.

⁷ Engelmann also utilizes this concept, since, according to his account, architects want to create objects that can be perceived as a single unit. Thus, perspicuous representation is a necessary condition for architectural design.

⁸ In Section 19 he refers to section 2:

Let us imagine a language...meant to serve for communication between a builder A and an assistant B. A is building with building-stones; there are blocks, pillars, slabs and beams. B has to pass the stones, and that in the order in which A needs them. For this purpose they use a language consisting of the words 'block', 'pillar', 'slab', 'beam'. A calls them out; --B brings the stone which he has learnt to bring at such-and-such a call. -- Conceive of this as a complete primitive language. (Wittgenstein 1968: §2)

⁹ The term 'the language of the image' arises in the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* where he presented a position with deep affinities to Russell's logical atomism, at least from a planning perspective. But unlike Russell, Wittgenstein formulates a metaphysics according to which the world consists of simple facts that are independent of each other; these facts constitute the substance – the last subject of the experimental sciences. According to Wittgenstein, the purpose of the language as a tool of thought is to determine the facts and this is done by an image or by creating a picture of the facts, which is to say that language has to be structurally similar to that which it describes.

¹⁰ Wittgenstein used to encourage his senior students to abandon their studies of philosophy in favor of more significant work of a more practical nature.

¹¹ Wittgenstein tried to find his calling as a teacher and was tormented by thoughts of suicide. In one of his letters to Engelmann from before their collaboration on the Stonborough House, he even suggested the possibility that he would join Engelmann by immigrating to pre-state Israel in order to start a new life. But their collaboration in building the Stonborough House, which was supposed to provide them with an opportunity to implement their shared ideas, ultimately was unsuccessful and ended when Wittgenstein forbade his friend from continuing to work on the project

¹² Verbal gestures impress us as an experience which is not the same as providing information or a statement.

¹³ The judgment of taste, by which an object is declared to be beautiful under the condition of a definite concept, is not pure.

¹⁴ From the diaries of Engelmann (Youth Movement), Paul Engelmann Archive, Ms.Var 333/217 Zionist Archives, the National Library, the Hebrew University, Givat Ram, Jerusalem. In Vienna, Engelmann also fell under the influence of the cultural critic Karl Kraus; he acted as his personal

secretary around 1910 and conducted a meaningful dialogue with him at the time about literature, art and culture.

¹⁵ This pattern of activity was characteristic of other remarkable figures from the Viennese Modernist stage with whom Engelmann had some sort of relationship, including the culture critic Karl Kraus (1874-1936). Although the natural evolution of the 'Wiener-Moderne' Viennese school ceased due to the political vicissitudes of the 1930s, its spirit was continued by many of its members that immigrated to different countries. On Engelmann see: Engelmann, 1946a; Engelmann, 1946b; Engelmann, 1967.

¹⁶ A kibbutz, meaning 'gathering' or 'clustering' in Hebrew, is a type of communal settlement unique to the Zionist enterprise. Founded on the socialist values of equality, communal ownership, and mutual responsibility and based on the aspiration for a renewed settlement in the Land of Israel, kibbutz members believed in the sharing of property and wealth, principles that some scholars present as utopian. (Near 1997)

¹⁷ We do not know which kibbutz this was and the manuscript of the lecture bears no clear date. It was hand-written in block letters (in Hebrew with spelling mistakes) and in some places Engelmann includes words in German. The sketch attached to the papers of the lecture is dated May 31, 1938 which offers the only concrete evidence for the time period in which this lecture was delivered. The text was found in the Paul Engelmann Archive at the Central Zionist Archives, the National Library, the Hebrew University, Givat Ram, Jerusalem. (Hereafter, Engelmann, 'The Kibbutz Lecture').

¹⁸ The significance of its adjacency to the text by Loos should not be downplayed as it demonstrates how Engelmann saw his architectural conception, or wanted it to be seen, as stemming from the foundations established by Loos.

¹⁹ This seems to owe some debt to the essay 'Heimatkunst' published by Loos in 1914 which outwardly seems to criticize the use of vernacular forms and types by architects in the modern era, yet ultimately affirms Loos' underlying commitment to the notion of 'proper form.' (Loos 1931)

²⁰ Engelmann was influenced by Loos' writings in which he claimed that classic architecture, especially in its Roman form (inclusive of the atrium) is an eternal 'pattern' that inspires all types of architecture, including the Modern. (Engelmann 1946a)

²¹ In this discussion Engelmann wanted to emphasize the 'form of life', the local culture, and he used this rhetoric against the 'blindness' of the European elite and their degrading attitude towards traditional-regional models. Engelmann sarcastically comments that traditionally the atrium can be found in atrophied slums, and adds about the attitude of the modernist architects in Tel-Aviv towards this tradition: 'of course it isn't the way of architects to learn from the Yemenite... but since pictures of atriums can also be found in American journals... they are allowed to build like them...' (Engelmann 1946b: 16).

²² At the time Engelmann was in Vienna (1914-1933) he struggled to develop an independent viewpoint, and mostly implemented the architectural ideas of Loos. The few structures that he planned at that time do not deviate or innovate from the ones planned by his teacher.

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Image credits

(Figure 1) Stonborough House, sketches drafted by Engelmann, 1929.

Photo credit: Bundesdenkmalamt, Vienna, Courtesy, P.H. Stronborough, Genolier.

(Figure 2) Stonborough House, by Ludwig Wittgenstein, Vienna, 1929.

Photo credit: Bundesdenkmalamt, Vienna, Courtesy, P.H. Stronborough, Genolier.

(Figure 3) Engelmann's Kibbutz lecture, page 16.

Paul Engelmann Archive, The National Library of Israel, ARC. Ms. Var. 335.

(Figure 4) The cover of the book: Adolf Loos, *Real Style*, Trans. J. Schächter & P. Engelmann Tel Aviv, 1946.

(Figure 5) Atrium from: Adolf Loos, *Real Style*, Trans. Y. Schechter & P. Engelmann Tel Aviv, 1946